



14<sup>th</sup> Annual  
Japan-U.S. Security Seminar:  
Next Generation Perceptions of  
U.S.-Japan Relations



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## Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS ([www.pacforum.org](http://www.pacforum.org)) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

## The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, [www.pacforum.org](http://www.pacforum.org), or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at [bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com](mailto:bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com).

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of Young Leader program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

# Introduction

By Brad Glosserman

The U.S.-Japan security alliance is a vital component of U.S. engagement with Asia and a key contributor to security and prosperity in the region. Its vitality is important to the security of both countries and stability throughout Asia. It is therefore quite troubling to see that doubts now seem to beset the alliance, with both partners questioning the commitment of the other to the relationship. (For a more complete explanation and examination of the state of the alliance, see “Japan-U.S. Security Relations: Alliance under Strain,” available at the [www.pacforum.org](http://www.pacforum.org).)

A select group of American and Japanese Young Leaders has attended the last several meetings of the Japan-U.S. security seminar, the annual meeting co-hosted by the Pacific Forum CSIS that explores the issues and outlook for this critical relationship. In addition to probing the key challenges for their countries, the Young Leader program gives participants a chance to begin building relationships among the next generation of security professionals that will be working on these problems.

In the report that follows, a group of Young Leaders from each country probes the differences in perspectives between the two countries. In particular, they were trying to see if the other country understands its own thinking: do the Japanese “get” U.S. concerns (and vice versa)? The short answer is yes, but that is to be expected. The two countries have a long history of interaction and the two security communities are deeply interwoven. There is a sensitivity to the other’s thinking and perspective.

At the same time, the two countries have, for various and quite understandable reasons, different national interests. As a result, despite their many shared interests and concerns, they have different priorities. Our Young Leaders focus on these differences and try to identify ways to overcome them. The conclusions of Japanese Young Leaders are especially striking. They (along with the U.S. YLs) acknowledge the domestic political constraints that hinder Tokyo, and Japan’s continuing ambivalence toward adopting a more military-oriented posture. They urge their government to think more creatively about international contributions to peace and security and to adopt a forward-looking agenda, rather than responding passively to the U.S.; integral to this approach is the formulation of a Japanese strategy. Hopefully, these young scholars and analysts will be doing just that in the next few years.



# 14<sup>th</sup> U.S.-Japan Security Seminar: Young Leaders Perspective

By Sophia Yang

## **The Fed**

Before the 14<sup>th</sup> annual U.S.-Japan Security Seminar commenced in San Francisco, the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders visited the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco for a look at how the 12<sup>th</sup> branch of the U.S. central bank operates. The visit began with a private meeting with Chris Sigur, an Asia specialist, who led an engaging discussion on economic trends in Asia and connected the trends to the U.S. economy.

Although the U.S. economy suffers from the sub-prime mortgage crisis, Sigur explained that most Asian countries are less vulnerable to the U.S. downturn, largely because of the lessons learned from the 1997 Asia Financial Crisis, which forced countries to improve risk management systems, corporate governance, and regulatory environments. He added that Japan, having learned its lessons when its economy burst in the early 1990s, has a comparative advantage and can become a regional leader in financing (Japan's ability to play a leadership role in Asia would be hotly debated at the seminar later).

Following the conversation with Sigur, our group was given a tour of the Fed. Before our departure, we were each presented with a bag of shredded U.S. currency as a souvenir. According to a trivial fact on the bag: "Every day the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and its Branch operations alone shred about \$60 million worth of worn out bills!"

## **U.S.-Japan Security Seminar: Day 1**

The 14<sup>th</sup> annual U.S.-Japan Security Seminar, jointly sponsored by The Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco, and the Pacific Forum CSIS, brought together a distinguished group of U.S.-Japan alliance experts, Departments of State and Defense representatives, representatives from Japan's Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and other current and former governmental representatives – all attending in their private capacities.

Experts and government officials identified at the beginning of the discussions numerous issues on which the U.S.-Japan alliance need to collaborate: stabilizing the Korean peninsula, reducing cross-Strait tensions, and hedging against China's growing and obscure power. Clearly, the U.S. and Japan do not seem to lack the glue, or issues, to bind their alliance together in the post-Cold War.

By the end of discussions, however, the consensus among Japanese observers seemed to be that there was a priority gap in the alliance. For example, whereas the U.S. places a higher priority on the war on terror, Japan's security focus remains in Asia. On North Korea, Japanese participants expressed concern that the U.S. would be willing to settle for a nuclear North Korea if it moves too quickly to normalize relations with Pyongyang. Frustrations on

both sides were evident as Japanese participants expressed fears that Japan is losing significance in the global arena as Japan's domestic politics enters new territory, and the Liberal Democratic Party is increasingly challenged by the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan. One participant from Japan expressed disappointment in the Tokyo government when it refused to allow Self-Defense Forces to send helicopters to Afghanistan to help Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. participants echoed similar frustrations, adding that Japan must invest in its relevance if it wants to remain an international power. While one Japanese participant mentioned 2010 as a big year for redefining the alliance, alliance managers on the U.S. side argued the alliance cannot wait until 2010, expressing confusion why some in Japan are calling for new declarations when terms of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), launched at the end of 2002, have not been carried out.

### **Breakfast Meeting With Evans Revere**

With Evans Revere, a former career diplomat now head of Korea Society of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Young Leaders were fortunate to have a breakfast meeting in his off-the-record discussion, he talked about North Korea in particular the recent historic trip of the New York Philharmonic to Pyongyang and other issues in U.S.-Korean Peninsula relations.

### **U.S.-Japan Security Seminar: Day 2**

The second day of discussions focused on the future of the alliance, but there was considerable reiteration of points made the day before. The priority gap was again mentioned as well as the suggestion that the alliance recalibrate. Although participants gave suggestions on how to move the alliance forward, there was little agreement on the best way forward.

### **Young Leaders Discussion**

Before the conference Young Leaders were asked to provide their perspectives of the security priorities of Japan and the U.S. Those papers predicted many of the topics mentioned during the seminar: stabilization of East Asia, maritime security, building consensus in Japan's domestic politics, North Korea's denuclearization, and China's growing military power.

During our discussion after the conference, Young Leaders questioned the strength and purpose of the alliance. While some welcomed the idea that the U.S. and Japan cooperate closely on issues beyond the traditional security realm, others questioned the practicality of broadening the alliance. As only YL explained,

The U.S.-Japan alliance is a pillar of the U.S. military strategy in the Pacific and needs to be nurtured by both parties if it is to survive. But, in their enthusiasm for relations among themselves, the U.S. and Japan should not try to make the alliance be all things to all people and thus dilute its military purpose. Overburdening the alliance, and confusing its purpose will likely only weaken it. This probably means that policymakers should be careful



to limit the kinds of issues that alliance managers are directly responsible for, and the constituents within their respective governments that they are accountable to. This does not mean that Japan and the U.S. shouldn't deal with climate change or pandemic flu, or that they shouldn't attempt to work together to build stronger regional institutions in the region. It means only that these jobs shouldn't be taken on in the halls of PACOM or the Pentagon, but should reside in more appropriate government departments.

If only the U.S. and Japan could shred their problems as easily as the Fed shreds worn out bills.



# Old Friends, New Times: the Perception Gap and the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

By Michele Fugiel Gartner, Kristi Govella,  
Dianna Hummel, Kerry Nankivell, and Sophia Yang

Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been conceptualized as the key force underpinning security in the Asia-Pacific, once described by the late Senator Michael Mansfield as “the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.” However, much has changed since the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, leading many to question the structure of the alliance and its relevance for the world today. Moreover, the definition and future direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance have been the subject of debate not only amongst political spectators but among the allies themselves. On March 28-29, 2008, Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders from North America and Japan gathered to discuss these issues, and specifically, to identify and illuminate the perception gap in each country’s security priorities and in their individual visions for the future of the alliance. The following are the thoughts of the North American Young Leaders attending the seminar.

## **Does Our Ally Understand Us? Japanese Perceptions of U.S. Security Priorities**

While Japan generally understands the security priorities of its ally, the difficulty seems to lie in its ranking of these priorities rather than in their identification. For instance, while both the U.S. and Japan list North Korea among their top security concerns, U.S. concern over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is largely fueled by the larger proliferation issue and the possible spread of nuclear technology from North Korea to terrorist organizations. Japanese anxieties surround their country’s close proximity to a new nuclear weapons-enabled state and the unresolved issue of a number of Japanese citizens abducted by the DPRK in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, while the countries may agree on the importance of dealing with a nuclear North Korea and a rising China, the motivations for doing so and the opinions about what should be done may not be aligned. If not recognized and addressed, this divergence in reasons for prioritization will cause potential friction in the relationship, particularly when the goal of one country is achieved seemingly at the expense of the other. We have already seen this happening during the Six-Party Talks, with the U.S. and Japan often in disagreement about the expectations that the DPRK should have to meet to be removed from the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism, for example.

A more overt divergence of perceptions is evident in Japanese and U.S. perceptions of the War on Terror. Since 9/11, this war has been the focus of the Bush administration, and has consumed many resources of the U.S. A war without physical boundaries, this conflict also dominates U.S. security concerns in East Asia and has direct relevance for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The support of some Japanese politicians, most notably former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, for the U.S.-led war on terror seemed to bring the two countries closer together, but recent changes in the Japanese domestic political scene have made this kind of support unlikely, with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) at odds on a host of issues. This political stalemate has complicated an already complex political environment within Japan with respect to alliance management.

The refueling mission for the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was but one example – and symptom – of the problem. Moreover, the tone of Japanese support for the war on terror strikes some as a public relations strategy designed to avoid the criticisms of “checkbook diplomacy” that Japan received during the first Gulf War. Thus, Japan finds itself pulled in many directions, particularly between meeting the expectations of its ally and the international community and between dealing with the gridlock currently dominating its domestic politics.

## **Understanding Ourselves: Identifying U.S. Security Priorities in East Asia**

We have identified the following three U.S. security priorities in East Asia:

### *1) Upholding Previous Military Agreements*

The U.S.-Japan military alliance is a key pillar of the U.S. military presence and involvement in the East Asian region. Since the end of the Cold War, attempts have been made to transform the alliance into an entity that better serves this purpose; however, implementation of these changes has been slow and problematic. This aspect of the alliance is often frustrating for the U.S. military because of Japan’s struggle to overcome a pacifist constitution, pacifist public, regional pressure for less military activity out of Japan’s territory, and reluctance to spend any significant part of their budget on the JSDF. A first and essential step in ensuring the security of East Asia will be for the U.S. to shore up its key alliance in the region. For example, force realignment plans agreed under the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), once fully implemented, will help move forward joint efforts to engage or hedge against China and maintain peace between China and Taiwan.

### *2) Determining Clear Priorities*

The U.S.-Japan alliance was designed in a different time for a different purpose; as such, both nations need to nurture the alliance and help it to best meet the needs of today’s security environment. The two countries should find a way to use their respective strengths to enhance their partnership. For example, instead of criticizing Japan for not making headway in its journey toward becoming a “normal country,” the U.S. should find space for Japan to help in ways that are less controversial but still contribute to the alliance. That said, the U.S. and Japan should avoid, in their enthusiasm for nurturing their relationship, trying to make the alliance all things to all people. The U.S.-Japan alliance is fundamentally a military alliance; clear priorities will help it grow, while a proliferation of side projects and tangents will only cause it to suffer. Other types of cooperation are important, but they should operate under different auspices.

If the U.S. wants to create a more comprehensive approach to the region, it will mean working to dispel the notion that Japan and the U.S. work in lockstep. Successful examples can be found in other U.S. bilateral relationships; while the U.S. and the United Kingdom share a close military relationship, London and Washington deal with trade issues much differently than they do military ones. Thus, a bilateral alliance in one area does not require bilateral alliance in all areas to remain viable. Policymakers should be careful to limit the

kinds of issues that alliance managers are directly responsible for, and the constituents within their respective governments to whom they are accountable. This does not mean that Japan and the U.S. should not deal with climate change or pandemic flu, or that they should not attempt to work together to build stronger regional institutions in the region. It means only that these jobs should not be taken on in the halls of PACOM or the Pentagon, but should reside in more appropriate government departments or intergovernmental organizations.

Determining clear priorities will play an important role in stabilizing the North Korean threat, as both the U.S. and Japan should resolve their differences with regard to what they hope to achieve with respect to the DPRK. The Six-Party Talks represent an important opportunity for the allies to work together to achieve improvements on a common security threat. The allies should strive to minimize their public disagreement and to show a united front to those they hope to convince, while each endeavors to protect its own interests as well as that of its key partners.

### *3) Managing the War on Terror*

The war on terror will continue to dominate U.S. security policy into the next presidency. However, the United States should be wary that the war on terror and the call for burden sharing from its alliance partners is not its major concern in Asia. It should be remembered that Northeast Asia and the security problems there are different from other parts of the globe. Security concerns such as disaster relief, piracy, global warming, energy resources, sustainable development, stopping the spread of nuclear proliferation, and pandemic diseases are much more likely to be of concern to Asian neighbors and friends than a mission to eradicate terrorism in the Middle East. When asking for support from its allies and partners, the U.S. should carefully consider the burden that it is putting on these countries. Moreover, the U.S. should take care not to neglect the region or its allies, despite the considerable attention that it must devote to other areas. It should maintain its participation in bilateral and multilateral dialogues and avoid the impression that the U.S. is disinterested in Asia simply because it is not as troubled as other regions.

### **Implications of this Perception Gap for the U.S.-Japan Alliance**

While there seems to be consensus on priorities within the U.S.-Japan alliance, there is actually less unity than it seems. Many priority issues are the same, but the underlying rationales for prioritization are different, and this subtle disagreement threatens to pose problems. Thus, while the Japan and the U.S. agree that North Korea is a problem, their motivations and resultant policy preferences differ. The implication of this perception gap is simple misunderstanding in the best case, and acrimony and mutual suspicion in the worst. To address this tension, there needs to be more effort to promote understanding and build consensus on priorities and potential solutions. Ideally, Japan would become a strong player in Asia, one that could be a strong partner for the U.S. The U.S. in turn would work proactively and cooperatively with Japan to tackle the challenges of the region. This will require much more communication and cooperation than is currently possible, even just in terms of intelligence sharing or discussions between leaders.

While Japan should make earnest attempts to deal with its very genuine domestic concerns, the U.S. should be mindful of Japan's domestic political situation and understand the constraints under which its leaders must operate. The DPJ is neither pro- nor anti-alliance, but it has chosen to pursue a strategy of disagreeing with the LDP, implying the role that the JSDF can play abroad will continue to be limited in the near term. Still, Japan cannot continue to place blame on domestic political turmoil if it wants to maintain a healthy alliance as well as its relevance as a global power; former Prime Minister Koizumi proved that it is possible to navigate Japan's bureaucracy with strong leadership skills, and the bar has been raised. At the same time, maintaining trust in the alliance requires the U.S. to not to expect Japan to automatically follow its lead. Even U.S. experts on Japan seem to listen to and then summarily dismiss Japanese concerns about their own domestic politics, economics, and security.

Perceptions and allies aside, Japan faces other more concrete obstacles to enlarging its security role in Asia. Much of the rest of Asia is hesitant to see a more robust JSDF, with many countries still sensitive to the legacy of Japanese aggression during World War II. However, Japan cannot hope to tackle these external challenges until it comes to a clearer understanding of what exactly it wants to do. Japan's politicians must be aware of this challenge and strive to balance a robust international agenda with a feasible domestic one.

### **Conclusion: A Stronger Alliance through Understanding and Trust**

The U.S.-Japan alliance is as integral a part of the security of the United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific Region – as it has been for the last 50 years. However, the world has changed, and the time has come for the alliance partners to strive for greater understanding of and trust in one another. This group finds that the perception gap between these two countries may be exaggerated, there are however important, albeit subtle, sources of tension that must be addressed. Now, when the region is free of overt conflict, is a perfect time for these subtleties to be hammered out and for the allies to work to make their partnership into a sound and viable means of securing the region. They have a solid base on which to build, but the cultivation of greater understanding and trust will be essential to ensuring the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

# Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing Priority Gaps in the Japan-U.S. Alliance

By Tetsuo Kotani, Kentaro Orita, Ryo Sahashi,  
Nao Shimoyachi, and Kiyoto Tsuji

During their last meeting, held on the sidelines of the G8 Summit in early July, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo and U.S. President George W. Bush reaffirmed the importance and strength of the Japan-U.S. security alliance, saying that it had been significantly deepened over the past eight years under the Bush administration. Despite the two leaders' assurances, however, concerns about the soundness of the alliance have been conspicuously voiced in the past year or so. There is ample basis for these concerns: Japan's failure to extend the anti-terrorism law in a timely manner, which resulted in a four-month suspension of the Maritime Self-Defense Force refueling mission in the Indian Ocean to assist the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism; the softening of the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea, which raised concerns in Japan about the prospects for resolving the problem of Japanese citizens abducted to North Korea; and different views and calculations on the rise of China, to name a few. What challenges exist within the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is often described as the most solid bilateral alliance in the world?

## **Diverging Priorities**

Japan and the United States have been groping for a common security goal for nearly two decades. During the Cold War, the *raison d'être* of their alliance was clear: Japan provided financial and institutional support for the U.S. fight against communism in exchange for an extended security umbrella by the United States over Japan. The 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security was an attempt to keep the alliance from drifting apart in a new security environment after the demise of the Soviet Union. But the emergence of a new security order had to wait until the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States that dramatically revealed a world marked by great uncertainties. This event forced the U.S. and other nations to review their defense strategies to meet new challenges posed by terrorism and missile threats, resulting in the release of the 2002 National Security Strategy featuring the option of preemptive strikes by the United States and the adoption of the 2004 National Defense Program Outline aiming at "multifunctional and flexible" defense capabilities in Japan.

In short, Tokyo and Washington share perceptions on international security and the type of threats to be countered; the problem lies in differences in the priorities these countries attach to their respective national security agendas. First, there is a perception gap on the geographical scope of the alliance. While U.S. defense planners look at the alliance with Japan in the context of a broader global strategy, which is now aimed at creating flexible and agile forces swiftly deployable anywhere in the world as part of its global force posture realignment, Japanese policymakers have to manage the alliance within the scope of the "minimum level" necessary for self-defense under the pacifist Constitution. Although defining the "minimum level" is an extremely difficult matter in this era of unpredictable threats, it is nonetheless obvious that its geographical scope – currently defined as "areas

surrounding Japan”– is much smaller than that of the U.S. Second, related to this perception gap on the alliance’s geographical scope is the fact that much of the U.S. attention is currently focused on the Middle East and Afghanistan (i.e. the war on terrorism). This results in gaps in policy planning in East Asia, such as in policies toward North Korea and China. While denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a matter of urgent security concern for Japan due to its geographical proximity, the U.S. appears more concerned about nonproliferation partly to save its energy for the Middle East, has been pointed out by some analysts. Toward China, the U.S. basically continues its engagement policy to integrate the rising country into the fabric of international regimes as a “responsible stakeholder,” while hedging against uncertainties. Again partly due to geographical proximity and regional rivalry, Japan perceives the rise of China as more threatening than does the U.S. – China was identified along with North Korea as a key security concern for Japan’s national security in the 2004 National Defense Program Outline – although efforts have been made to improve Sino-Japanese relations in the past year.

How should we manage these gaps between Japan and the U.S. in the perception of their alliance? The rest of this essay attempts to answer this question by examining two typical Japanese views on security in the post-Cold War environment. One derives from a traditional defense-oriented stance that Japan’s security strategy should aim only at the protection of the lives and properties of the Japanese people. The other is more ambitious, arguing that Japan should play a more active role in maintaining international peace and stability, a view that has gained support among Japanese since the first Gulf War in 1991 when Japan’s enormous financial contribution (\$13 billion) was criticized as “checkbook diplomacy.”

### **Japan’s Defense-Oriented Ideology and the Japan-U.S. Alliance**

Japan has traditionally assumed under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty that, in addition to its Self-Defense Forces (SDF), a firm security commitment by the U.S. is indispensable to defend its citizens and wealth from direct threats. Therefore how to hold U.S. attention and maintain its commitment to Japan and its surrounding areas have been key questions for Japan’s defense policy.

Under this “inward-looking” policy assumption, the most reasonable security agenda for Japan has been almost exclusively focusing upon the defense of its own territory and people. As the public has gradually come to be concerned about the threat from North Korea and the rise of China after the Cold War, coping with “situations in areas surrounding Japan (SIASJ)” has also grown in importance. To maintain peace and stability in these areas, this argument goes, Japan needs to develop a deterrence capability and reinforce cooperation with the U.S. This involves advancing the credibility of extended deterrence by the U.S. and asking the U.S. to relax its arms export restriction, as symbolized by the issue of *F22* sales to Japan, in order to bolster Japan’s air and naval power. Furthermore, allowing Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense, acquiring the capability to attack enemy command centers, effectively transforming U.S. bases in Japan, further cooperating on missile defense with the U.S., and pursuing a buildup of U.S. “sea control” capability to counter China’s “sea denial” capability would also be necessary.



According to this line of thought, extending cooperation to U.S. global security efforts, such as the fight against terrorism, is of secondary importance. Even expanding the geographical sphere of SDF activities beyond areas surrounding Japan might not be given the highest priority. It is often explained in Japan that international cooperation activities by the SDF are more a mere means of bolstering the Japan-U.S. alliance than of contributing to international stability. This type of argument was often expressed during the Diet deliberations, with advocates asserting that, because the dispatches of the Air and Ground SDFs to Iraq and of the Maritime SDF to the Indian Ocean have clearly shown Japan's strategic value to the U.S., the U.S. cannot dismiss Japan's eager demands for U.S. commitment to the Japanese security agenda. Proponents of this argument believe that this was visibly reflected in the close bilateral policy coordination vis-à-vis North Korea.

For many Japanese, the top security concern and priority remains North Korea. The situations in the Middle East and Afghanistan have not reached a serious level of concern, despite their close link to Japanese economic interests. This is because, unlike Europe, Japan's territorial security is not threatened by Iranian missiles, for instance, and Japan's historical connection to these areas is weak. Moreover, international terrorism has not been active on Japanese soil. Therefore, Washington's weak commitment to and diplomatic bargaining in East Asia relative to those to and in the Middle East and Afghanistan tends to be amplified by the Japanese media and opinion leaders as a sign of its ally's disrespect for the alliance.

There are several restraints on Japan's contribution to the war on terror. Japan has limited defense assets to contribute to the global efforts against terrorism. In this sense, concentrating on Japan's own defense and U.S.-Japan cooperation in SIASJ can be viewed as a way of ensuring the effective use of scarce assets. For example, when Japan dispatched *Aegis* destroyers to the Indian Ocean between 2002 and 2004, there was concern about sending outside the region one of the four *Aegis* destroyers that Japan possesses, should North Korean nuclear programs turn out to be active. It was argued, therefore, that using Japan's defense assets for missions outside the region should be kept to a minimum.

Despite Japan's contribution to the U.S. global war on terror, however, it is not obvious whether such efforts have led to a stronger U.S. commitment to the alliance. Many Japanese feel that the United States is too focused on counter-proliferation rather than denuclearization with regard to North Korea. North Korea poses a direct threat to Japan's national security, but not necessarily to that of the U.S. On the other hand, it is difficult for the Japanese government to maintain domestic support for such efforts as the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq and the Indian Ocean at a time when the Japanese public does not feel threatened by global terrorism at home and the U.S. war on terror is unpopular on a global scale.

Although Japan has been increasingly engaged in promoting its international security agenda for the past few decades, for the national-defense-oriented school, this commitment is merely out of fear that the U.S. might abandon Japan if Tokyo does not pay its dues. The so-called "Gulf-War Syndrome," in fact, derives from America's persistent criticism of Japan as a "free rider" of global security. In this context, while international cooperation is listed as one of the SDF's main missions in the new National Defense Program Outline adopted in

2004, Japan's *honne* (true intention) might rather be to persuade the U.S. that Japan continues to be a reliable ally than to implement independent efforts to enable Japan to assume global responsibility as the world's second economic superpower.

### **The Japan-U.S. Alliance for Global Agenda**

For Japan (and the U.S.), national defense strategy in the 21st century is one in which national interests deeply intersect with global security concerns. Traditional security issues such as homeland protection from direct enemy attack certainly remain one of the most important reasons for Japan to maintain its SDF and the alliance. However, since the scope of threats has expanded on a global scale, it is ultimately in Japan's national interest to assume a greater responsibility in maintaining the peace and stability of the current world order. The emergence of this "outward-looking" policy assumption coincides with increasing eagerness on the part of the Japanese people to engage in benevolent international cooperation, such as humanitarian rescue and societal reconstruction in post-conflict areas, as shown in the growing popularity of the term *kokusai koken* (international contribution).

As the world's second largest economy, Japan has the financial and technological potential to make great contributions to international security. The question is whether Japan should assume a greater leadership role by enhancing security cooperation with its most important ally, the United States, or do so through other more neutral organizations, such as the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or in nonmilitary ways, such as the provision of official development assistance (ODA)?

During the Persian Gulf War, Japan learned a valuable lesson from the frustration that resulted from its massive financial assistance that drew criticisms from the international community as faceless "check-book" diplomacy. The embarrassment taught Japan the importance of showing leadership in the international arena through "action," which became one of the driving forces behind a political debate over the role of the SDF and the Japan-U.S. alliance. This development was to the liking of the U.S., which induced Japan to assume a greater responsibility in successfully tackling the complex matrix of the new international security order, including the need to ensure the security and stability of the "non-Western," underdeveloped world, as revealed by the September 11 incident.

However, Japanese domestic support for enhanced security cooperation with the U.S. is unlikely to be achieved in an era of declining U.S. soft power. The deployment of SDF forces to Iraq had been met with severe opposition, and the U.S. force realignment in Okinawa has been a long and time-consuming procedure. Furthermore, serious crimes committed by U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan, including cases of rape and murder of Japanese citizens, have diminished the Japanese people's understanding of the need to maintain U.S. bases in Japan. Under these circumstances, it is hard to expect the Japanese government to commit itself further to the alliance and U.S. global military operations unless they are given clear legitimacy under the framework of the UN Security Council.

Furthermore, Japanese people are still highly sensitive to participating in operations outside Japan, both military and civilian, probably due to public memory of World War II of

the miserable deaths of countless civilians and low-ranked soldiers. Among government agencies, the Ministry of Defense is seemingly the most cautious about deploying the SDF to missions in high-risk areas. Pacifism is still a popular belief in Japan, even though the SDF's international missions have become a pillar of Japanese strategy.

Meanwhile, there are many who praise the SDF's role as a way to promote Japan's soft power. Since its first overseas peacekeeping mission, not only has the SDF contributed to global peace and security, it has also gained the trust of the people in the region, and helped refute the argument that Japan's military power would facilitate the rise of imperialism. Japan's Achilles' tendon in expanding its international role would be the negative images that some nations associate with the SDF. Any rational review of Japan's postwar military activities would conclude that the country is a fully democratic nation in complete control of its forces and free from the urge for military domination but political rhetoric has often been ineffective in defeating this contention. The SDF's overseas activities have served also as a way to justify the role of the SDF. This strategic aspect could be recognized in Japan's domestic discussions regarding the SDF dispatch to Sudan. It would obviously enhance Japan's reputation as a peacebuilder.

Given that Tokyo and Washington share a commitment to global peace and stability, the two countries might better manage the priority gaps in the bilateral alliance by negotiating where and how they direct their energy and resources for that purpose. Yet, the biggest challenge here is Japanese public opinion. Given the Japanese people's military sensibilities, collaboration with the U.S. might be more easily managed in nonmilitary fields, including capacity building on operation management in the post-conflict stage, human rights development, and democratization assistance. Yet for that purpose, it is critical for Japan again to make contributions through official development aid, which has been decreasing due to an annual budget ceiling. It would be desirable for the alliance to make a clear commitment to and proposals for further development in this field. The best areas of burden-sharing for Japan are economic and social aid and civilian missions and, if the United States asks for burden-sharing, both governments should target these areas. The Japanese government and policy circles should realize that increasing the budget in defense and in ODA would result in the dual increase of commitments to burden-sharing in the alliance.

## **Conclusion**

The Japan-U.S. alliance remains the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Although discrepancies over particular policy issues have been played up recently, fundamental gaps in the perception of the alliance, at both the strategic and psychological levels, have existed between the two allies throughout the history of their alliance. The U.S. preoccupation with the war on terrorism and its concentration on the Middle East and Afghanistan are the biggest sources of strain in the alliance in recent years. But Japan's search for a role in the global community has equally much to do with the strained bilateral relationship. Japan agrees with the U.S. that coping with terrorism is an important security agenda item, but has reservations about flexing its military muscle in doing so. Japan is eager to make greater *kokusai koken* (international contribution), but prefers to do so in a less forcible manner.

Japan has a tendency to conduct its policies as a means of fulfilling the expectations of the outside world. As in the past, Japanese leaders and policymakers have been keen on receiving a 'report card' from other relevant players for their international activities. At any Japan-U.S. related event in Washington, it is very common for Japanese media and government officials to ask American Asia specialists questions such as, "What did you think of Japan's role in Iraq?" Often times, the Americans will answer this question with "It's not what we think. It's how you think." Although uniformity is an essential factor in confronting difficult diplomatic issues, Japan should not feel pressured to diverge from the U.S. on various issues, whether it be Burma or Iran. Japanese leaders and government officials should transcend the traditional concept of defending only their territory and people, proactively propose Japan's own global strategy, and then talk with the Americans through the solid bilateral alliance on implementing its proper grand design as a global player. This could enhance Japan's strategic value in its relations with the U.S. and promote the incentives of the two for mutual security commitment within the alliance.

After all, one of the biggest attributes of a strong alliance is the ability to frequently engage in lively debates and discussions both at the track one and two levels. Japan should not fear confrontation with the U.S. in any way, and the U.S., in turn, should recognize the fact that although Japan is a nation with common values and interests, national interests differ at times given the nature of the two geopolitically diverse nations. When these priority gaps emerge, Japan should not feel pressured by the U.S., and the U.S. should not act in ways that would be perceived as condescending or forced. Free, open, and equal dialogue would result in a policy that would benefit both countries.

# American Strategy and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

By Nao Shimoyachi

The last time the United States released a comprehensive strategy for East Asia was in 1998. The U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region expressed the U.S. will to continue to serve as a guarantor of peace and security by advocating a continued presence of approximately 100,000 troops in the region. The report was the last of the Pentagon's four East Asia Reports that mapped out a post-Cold War U.S. strategy for the region in the 1990s. In retrospect, however, the 1990s was still very much a transition period from the Cold War to a post-Cold War era. The East Asia strategy was largely drawn from the Cold War doctrine of deterrence, relying on the "hub-and-spoke" bilateral security structure.

The security environment of East Asia, which the 1998 report described as "mostly at peace," has changed markedly. North Korea's nuclear ambitions, the rise of China and the revival of nationalism have all contributed to uncertainty and fluidity in East Asia. Most strikingly, the tragedy of the September 11 attacks in 2001 pushed the threat of terrorism to the top of the U.S. security agenda, prompting Washington to review its basic security principles maintained since the 1940s in a way that the end of the Cold War had not. To counter unpredictable threats, the George W. Bush administration declared that it would not hesitate to wage preventive war and act unilaterally, a doctrine that could make the concept of deterrence obsolete and undermine security partnerships forged during the Cold War. Since this new doctrine was applied to Iraq, much U.S. energy has been concentrated on the Middle East.

Current U.S. policy toward East Asia is very hard to define. Given the state of Iraq, a new U.S. administration will continue to be preoccupied with the Middle East and have little time and energy left to tend to East Asia and the alliance with Japan. Faced with this prospect, especially at a time when Japanese and U.S. security interests are beginning to diverge in some areas, Japanese policymakers are anxious about securing the U.S. commitment to the alliance. In this essay, I identify three security priorities for the United States in East Asia and consider the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

## **AMERICAN SECURITY PRIORITIES IN EAST ASIA**

### **Accommodating the Rising China**

From the long-term perspective, the first and foremost priority of the United States in East Asia is China. The U.S. is increasingly concerned about how China will use the power gained through its remarkable economic growth and intensive military modernization. The question is whether the rising power will threaten the status quo position of the United States. Current U.S. policy toward China is engagement, calling on Beijing to become a "responsible stakeholder" and attempting to integrate the country into the international order that the U.S. took the initiative in creating. China appears to be conforming to this U.S. policy by

advocating “peaceful development.” China needs a peaceful environment to keep its economy growing to divert domestic frustration arising from slow political reform at home.

The U.S.’ soft approach to China is creating anxieties among Japanese political circles who fear that Japan will be marginalized by the U.S. as it develops relations with China. Such anxieties were heightened in particular when U.S. presidential candidate Hillary Clinton called U.S.-China relations the most important bilateral relationship in the November/December 2007 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Washington is trying to reassure Tokyo by insisting that Japan would continue to be its ally because the Japan-U.S. relationship is rooted in the common political values of freedom and democracy.

### **Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime**

Terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction remains a top security concern for the United States, and in East Asia dealing with a nuclear North Korea poses a key challenge. Washington’s North Korea policy, however, has been overshadowed by developments in the larger war on terrorism. Just a few months after the September 11 attacks, President Bush designated North Korea as part of an “axis of evil,” effectively abandoning the engagement approach pursued under the Clinton administration. When the situation in Iraq deteriorated, however, a growing feeling emerged in the administration that “a foreign policy success story in North Korea would be of major value.”<sup>1</sup>

The United States is currently committed to a multilateral engagement policy under the framework of the Six-Party Talks initiated by Beijing. As agreed in February 2007, Washington is aiming to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions by pledging to lift economic sanctions, begin a process of removing the country from its terrorist sponsors list, and provide economic and energy assistance in cooperation with other six-party members. The softening of the U.S.’ stance, however, has created friction with Japan, which insists on resolution of the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s and is strongly opposed to U.S. removal of North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism before that occurs. Japan is also suspicious that the Bush administration has shifted its emphasis from complete denuclearization to nonproliferation. Due to geographical proximity, complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is more of an urgent security concern for Japan than nonproliferation.

### **Building a “Friendly” Multilateral Environment**

The third U.S. priority in the region is, put broadly, to create a multilateral environment that is friendly to U.S. interests. Developments in the war on terrorism are convincing Washington that it cannot cope with new types of threats alone. Today’s broad security concerns, including nuclear nonproliferation, energy security, pandemic diseases and the stability of financial markets, are also convincing Washington of the importance of multilateral cooperation.

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<sup>1</sup> Michael J. Mazarr, “The Long Road to Pyongyang: A case Study in Policymaking Without Direction,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2007.

The United States, however, has been cool to Asian efforts to create multilateral economic institutions that exclude the U.S., as seen in its opposition to the idea of setting up an Asian Monetary Fund proposed by Japan in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Today, the United States is alarmed by China's aggressive outreach to Southeast Asia and its advocacy of "Asian-only" groupings, suspecting that they are part of an attempt by Beijing to replace American hegemony. As an alternative, the U.S. has recently advocated triangular relations that will be formed through strengthening traditional bilateral alliances, such as Japan-U.S.-China, Japan-U.S.-Australia, and Japan-U.S.-South Korea relations. At the same time, it has taken the initiative in creating ad hoc issue-specific multilateral forums such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.

### **Implications for the Japan-U.S. Alliance**

The recent soft and multilateral approach of the United States toward East Asia is upsetting Japan. Japan is taking the U.S.' engagement policy toward China as another sign of "Japan passing," the term used in 1998 when U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Beijing without stopping over in Tokyo. It is also observing the softening of the U.S.' stance toward North Korea with alarm, suspecting that the U.S. is less concerned about Japan's security interests than before.

At the root of this fear and frustration is Japan's own sense of insecurity. Even though its economy is reviving, Japan has lost its vigor as an economic giant. It is faced with a neighbor with nuclear weapons, but Japanese policymakers are feeling that their options are constrained by the pacifist constitution. Such frustration in Japan is exacerbated by the rise of China, both economically and militarily, causing Japan to further cling to its ally.

Yet it should also be noted that the recent U.S. multilateralism in East Asia is not a carefully thought-out positive strategy. It is more of a negative result of the U.S. absorption in the Middle East – in other words, the consequence of less U.S. involvement in East Asian security affairs that pose no or little direct threat to U.S. security. The underlying assumption is, if Asian countries take greater responsibility for their own security, American security burdens within the "hub-and-spoke" alliance system would be reduced. While visiting Tokyo in November 2007, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged Japan to take on a greater role and said, "we would like to see more engagement and cooperation among our allies and security partners – more multilateral ties rather than hubs and spokes."<sup>2</sup>

The utmost security priority for the U.S. remains the eradication of global terrorist networks, and to achieve this, the Bush administration retains the option of preemptive strikes and is pressing ahead with global force realignment. In this regard, the United States wants Japan to play a larger role in maintaining regional security and more actively cooperate with its global strategy for fighting terrorism. In the U.S. reviews of its global force posture, the United States is attempting to "transform" the nonreciprocal nature of the alliance by proposing more integrated commands and coordinated operations between Japanese and U.S. forces. To facilitate this, explicitly and implicitly, Washington has been encouraging Japan's "normalization," i.e., Japan's reacquisition of the use of force as an instrument of foreign

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<sup>2</sup> Speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at Sophia University on November 9, 2007.

policy by lifting its self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right to collective self-defense and revising its pacifist constitution.

Strengthening Japan's security role in Asia and beyond is not an easy task, however. One obstacle is the opposition of China. This is rooted in what historian Kenneth B. Pyle called the "anomalous" nature of the Japan-U.S. alliance: its purpose was "not only to defend but also to restrain Japan." Beijing is now sounding alarms over Japan's enhanced role in the alliance, especially over the recent inclusion of Taiwan as a common strategic concern in the alliance. Another obstacle is Japanese public opinion. Even though an increasing number of Japanese accept a greater role for the Self-Defense Forces today, opinion polls show that they do so only as long as the SDF is engaged in non-combat peace operations. Very few Japanese are prepared to see the SDF shed blood fighting terrorists.

## **Conclusion**

With the options of preventive war and unilateral action, the Bush doctrine has the potential to make the Cold War concept of deterrence a thing of the past and to redraw the U.S. global security structure. The next U.S. president will soften the doctrine somewhat to improve America's image, but is unlikely to abandon it altogether. Japan, the most important country in the U.S. alliance system in East Asia, is in a dilemma: it wants to secure continued assurance of the alliance for the sake of its own security, but has difficulty in living up to the U.S.' expectation that it play a more active global security role.

One way to overcome this dilemma is enhancing cooperation in the fields of non-traditional security. Cooperating in measures against nontraditional global threats such as climate change, environmental degradation, pandemic diseases and poverty would keep alive a partnership that could otherwise be made meaningless in an age of unpredictable threats. In the long run, it would also help reduce the threat of terrorism, which is often born of miserable situations.



# Thoughts of the 14<sup>th</sup> Japan-U.S. Security Forum

## By Ryo Sahashi

The top three security concerns for the United States in East Asia today are the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the future of China. Russia and Southeast Asia, including community building, don't seem to be first-class concerns, and naturally, the United States does not have worries about reemerging Japanese militarism. On the surface, Japan seems to share these concerns as its top security priorities. However, if we inquire into approaches to these challenges, there are differences.

### North Korea

First, Washington and Japan have different attitudes and preferences in bilateral and multilateral negotiation processes regarding the DPRK's nuclear programs. While Japanese administrations have faced the abduction issue and a lack of public support for negotiations with the DPRK, American approaches have emphasized both the importance of negotiations and the prevention of further proliferation of WMD and missile technologies. This has resulted in suspicions about the reliability of the United States as the chief negotiator since it has seemed to accept small numbers of nuclear warheads in DPRK hands and seems ready to move forward with diplomatic relations before solving the abduction issue. This might be a mistaken perception, but such perceptions have grown in Japan.

Japan's dilemma is clear: it does not have resources to resolve the DPRK nuclear challenge, even though it keeps its one card of normalization and economic assistance. Thus, Japan has no way of pushing the hard line to bargain and reach compromises on nuclear, missile, or abduction issues. Japan finds itself isolated in the process whenever Washington reaches bilateral deals with Pyongyang, as in Berlin. As long as Japan has difficulty appreciating the means of negotiation, it is very unlikely that Japan will not fear isolation/abandonment by the United States.<sup>3</sup> This mentality leads to a positive evaluation of deadlock in negotiations, which looks strange to counterparts in friendly countries.

The Japanese government might think that the best approach for the DPRK issue is to have progress in Six-Party Talks and to put more pressure on the DPRK to gain more compromises from the DPRK. It might be tough for the United States to share this position, since it might be necessary to give carrots to the DPRK through bilateral and six-party talks. It might be possible to give some forms of assurance to Japan, preferably in public statements, that the United States will keep its bargaining and normalization, or any forms of change in diplomatic treatment of the DPRK, on pace with Japan, and insist that denuclearization of the whole peninsula is the ultimate and sole purpose of the policy vis-à-vis DPRK, and maintain concerns about the abduction issue in the process.

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<sup>3</sup> Negotiations might mean a give-and-take process in Washington, but in public at least Japanese understand negotiations to mean compromise keeping actors taking illegitimate actions. These different objectives of negotiation might be rooted in the lack of understanding of "diplomacy" in Japan and also in the populism present in diplomacy these days.

## **Cross-Strait**

On cross-Strait issues, Japan and the United States seem to share views of the presidential race and referendum in March 2008 in Taiwan. Both capitals, albeit with slightly different diplomatic wording, made clear that they did not want to see the controversial referendum on the UN application under the name of Taiwan or any actions that may jeopardize the status quo in the strait.

However, pro-Taiwan supporters appear to have decreased in Washington; while Japanese government and politicians took an accommodating stance toward Taiwan in recent years, such as on the visa-waiver program and a slow refusal of ROC referendum proposals. The U.S. State Department always applied serious pressure without any carrots. (The February report by American Enterprise Institute and Armitage International suggests a very pro-Taiwan stance, but it looks unlikely that such a proposal would be realized.) Japanese interests might lie in the peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait situation, and it is the case with the U.S. too. On the other hand, while Japan also put emphasis on economic and social ties with Taiwan, Washington has not been ready to make commitments in these fields. In addition, in Japan some politicians and experts still support the Democratic Progressive Party.

We need to watch closely political developments in Washington after the victory of Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT, and the protests by Tibetans.

## **Rise of China**

The third security challenge for the United States is the rise of China. This includes the implications of modernization of PLA forces and their increasing budgets, and social development in China, including diseases epidemics, environmental pollution, human rights, and a low compliance with the rule of law. Both capitals could share these problems, and they could and should find ways to share approaches that serve their interests. In other words, the rise of China in general is the most convenient factor to discuss in the bilateral framework. Unfortunately, many American thinktanks, foundations, and NGOs tend to work with Chinese counterparts bilaterally, especially in social development. Japanese society could do more burden sharing and this point should get more attention. A trilateral approach is important and might be significant for Japanese and U.S. government and non-government institutions to bilaterally discuss and share analysis and approaches toward development.

In the context of development aid and of weapons and technology export controls, European powers should be included in such fora to cope with challenges from the rise of China. The traditional trilateral approach among advanced democracies is worth considering.

## **Reluctant Japan**

Lastly, it should be noted that the United States might have concerns about Japan as one of its security problems. While Beijing has some suspicions that Japan might revert to

some form of militarism or collaborate/ integrate with U.S. forces, Washington's concerns focus on weak domestic support for burden sharing with U.S. regional and global operations.

Since Japanese domestic support is still most difficult to achieve in an era of declining U.S. soft power, Japanese political leaders cannot promise burden sharing with the U.S. U.S. soldiers are accused of serious crimes, including rape and murders.<sup>4</sup> We cannot expect the political situation to suddenly change and let the Japanese administration commit to the alliance and U.S. global military operations.

This situation might be more easily managed if the two countries have the same vision of global order and have low-level collaboration in nonmilitary fields, including capacity building on operations management in post-conflict situations, human rights development, assistance to democratization, etc. For that purpose, Japan needs to mobilize its people to support official development aid, which has been decreasing. It would be desirable for the alliance to commit to more development aid. Value diplomacy, which may come back, should be appreciated in this context. The best areas of burden sharing for Japan are economic and social aid and civilian missions: if the United States asks for burden sharing and support of legitimacy of its actions, it should target these areas.

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<sup>4</sup> I have participated in this conference since 2006 and found that images of domestic support for the Japan-U.S. alliance have been hurt. Making progress in Okinawa is unlikely in this political context. (Abe and Fukuda do not have strong personal interests to do so, either.)



# APPENDIX A

## About the Authors

**Ms. Michele FUGIEL GARTNER** is a Coordinator in the Executive Office at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation where she focuses on improving the systems and processes of governance, strategy development, and grantmaking. Michele received her M.A. degree in International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London and was selected to join Rotary International's Group Study Exchange to Saitama, Japan where she studied the role of philanthropy and Japanese civil society. She is currently Vice President of the Young Professionals International Network with the World Affairs Council and a volunteer grant writer for the Saul & Dayee G. Haas Foundation in Seattle. Michele holds B.A. in Communications and a minor in Spanish from Arizona State University and the Barrett Honors College and is an alumna of the Asia Pacific Leadership Program at the East-West Center in Honolulu, HI. She has worked with the Next Century Foundation in London, Phoenix Sister Cities Commission, and with the Himeji City Board of Education in Japan.

**Ms. Kristi Elaine GOVELLA** is a Ph.D. student at the University of California, Berkeley, where she focuses on international relations and comparative politics in East Asia. She specializes in Japanese politics and Asian regional institutional architecture and also serves as the Project Director of the Berkeley APEC Study Center. Ms. Govella holds a double B.A. in Political Science and Japanese from the University of Washington, Seattle, and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. She has worked with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in the past, in addition to teaching English in Japan through the JET Program.

**Ms. Dianna HUMMEL** is currently a master's candidate at both Hawaii Pacific University in Diplomacy and Military Studies and the University of Hawaii, Manoa in Asian Studies. Her research interest focuses on Sino-Japanese relations and The U.S. Japan Alliance. She joined the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies as a research assistant in May 2006 and to date had worked on projects involving Chinese separatist's moments in Xinjiang and Tibet, China-Japan-US Trilateral CSBS, Japan's security and foreign Relations in Asia, and Sino-Japanese energy relations.

**Mr. KOTANI Tetsuo** is a PhD candidate at Doshisha University and is currently a research fellow at Ocean Policy Research Foundation. His dissertation focus is on the strategic implication of homeporting U.S. carriers at Yokosuka. His other research interests include U.S.-Japan relations and international relations and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. His English publications include "Reaffirming the Taiwan Clause: Japan's National Interest in the Taiwan Strait and the US-Japan Alliance" (co-authored with Dr. Jim Auer) (NBR Analysis Vol. 16 No. 1, 2005) and "Presence and Credibility: Homeporting USS *Midway* at Yokosuka" in the *Journal of America-East Asian Relations* (forthcoming). He was a visiting fellow at the US-Japan Center at Vanderbilt University. He received the 2003 Defense Minister Prize for his essay.

**Ms. Kerry Lynn NANKIVELL** is a research officer at the Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters in British Columbia. She received her B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of British Columbia in 2000. She is an award winning writer and researcher. Her work has been published in Foreign Policy Magazine.

**Mr. ORITA Kentaro** is an officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), and also a student at School of Foreign Service (MSFS Program) at Georgetown. He joined the MOFA in April 2004, worked at the Northeast Asia Division for 2 years where he engaged in policy making toward Korean Peninsula issues. Mr. Orita received a B.A.S. in international relations from the University of Tokyo in 2004. He also obtained a certificate of the international program at SciencesPo (Political Science Institute), Paris in 2002.

**Mr. Ryo SAHASHI** is an Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy (GraSPP), the University of Tokyo. He also serves as a Research Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange. Previously, Mr. Sahashi served as a Research Associate / Program Officer for Policy Studies, Japan Center for International Exchange, as a Research Fellow of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, as a Research Assistant, Social Science Research Institute, International Christian University, and as a Research Assistant, Bureau of Trade Policy, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. Mr. Sahashi received his LL.M from the University of Tokyo and his Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts from the International Christian University after studying at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is currently completing his dissertation on American foreign policy towards China and Taiwan during the Cold War. Also, he is a recipient both of Minister of Foreign Affairs Award and of Japan Association of Taiwan Studies Distinguished Paper Award, a frequent invitee for Young Leaders Program of CSIS Pacific Forum, Honolulu, and currently registered as a non-residence fellow for security studies at Research Institute of Peace and Security (RIPS), Tokyo.

**Ms. Nao SHIMOYACHI** is a research fellow with The Japan Institute of International Affairs. Previously she was a staff writer for The Japan Times where she covered the evolution of Japanese security policy and people's reaction to it. She received her LL.B from the University of Tokyo and her MA in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, UK. At JIIA, she edits *AJISS-Commentary*, an English-language online publication featuring Japanese views on international affairs.

**Mr. Kiyoto TSUJI** joined the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. as a research associate in the summer of 2007, where he conducts research on the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Japanese politics, Asian institutional architecture, and democracy promotion. Mr. Tsuji has previously held positions in the private, public, and nonprofit sectors, including an advertisement consultant for an advertising agency in Tokyo, policy staff for a Japanese Diet member, and the Tokyo representative for Asia Society's 17<sup>th</sup> Asian Corporate Conference. Mr. Tsuji received his B.A. in economics from Kyoto University and his M.A. in international affairs from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. He was born in Tokyo and grew up in Vancouver, Canada, and is fluent in Japanese and English and proficient in French and German.

**Ms. Sophia YANG** is a MA candidate specializing in International Relations in Northeast Asia in the Graduate School of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where she also serves as Student Council President. During her time at the Pentagon in the Office of Asian & Pacific Security Affairs as a Harold Rosenthal fellow, she supported activities related to managing the U.S.-Japan alliance. Last summer, she participated in the 59<sup>th</sup> Japan-America Student Conference as an American student delegate in addition to serving as a student panelist at the Asia Youth Forum in Tokyo. Recently, she has been chosen as a finalist for the National Bureau of Asian Research's Next Generation Fellowship.





# APPENDIX B

14<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL

## JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY SEMINAR

*Jointly sponsored by  
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA),  
the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco,  
and the Pacific Forum CSIS*

**March 28-29, 2008**

*J.W. Marriott Hotel • San Francisco*

### AGENDA

#### **Friday, March 28**

*Participants arrive; Lunch at leisure*

3:00-3:10PM

***Skyline Room B & C, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor***

Welcoming Remarks: Ralph Cossa, Pacific Forum CSIS

3:10-3:20PM

**Opening Address:** Yukio Satoh, JIIA

3:20-3:30PM

**Keynote Address:** Ryozo Kato, Ambassador of Japan to the United States (delivered by Masafumi Ishii)

3:30-5:30PM

**Session I: Overview of the Global and Regional Security Environment**

*U.S. Presenter:* Michael Armacost, Asia Pacific Research Center

*Japan Presenter:* Hisayoshi Ina, *Nikkei Shimbun*

The opening session explores developments in the regional and global security environment since our last meeting. It is intended to identify priorities for the United States and Japan, within Asia and worldwide, and highlight both shared and divergent concerns. Topics could include issues related to China's growing status and influence in Asia (and the world); relations with Taiwan and the cross-Strait relationship, particularly after the presidential and parliamentary elections on the island; the North Korea denuclearization process; prospects for relations with Pyongyang; relations with South Korea after the ROK presidential elections; Middle East and Central Asian challenges; the role of multilateral institutions in Asia and the challenge posed by regional integration; and the role energy security plays in each country's foreign and national security policies. Is the regional balance of economic power shifting? How? What is its impact on the alliance? This overview will set the stage for subsequent discussions of U.S. and Japanese security policies and individual and bilateral efforts to address these challenges.

- 5:30 PM                    **Adjourn**
- 6:00 PM                    **Reception**                    *Skyline Room A, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor*
- 6:30- 9:00 PM            **Dinner**                    *Skyline Room A, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor*  
**Keynote Address:** Richard Armitage, President, Armitage International

**Saturday, March 29**

- 7:30-9:00AM            *Government officials-only breakfast meeting- Skyline Room A, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor*
- 8:00-9:00AM            *Continental Breakfast - Skyline Room B & C, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor*
- 9:00AM -12:15PM      **Session II: U.S. and Japan Security Strategies: Recent Changes, Future Plans, and Impact on Alliance Management**
- 9:00-10:30AM           **Session II A: Japan Overview**  
*Japan presenter:* Tsuneo Watanabe, Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Inst.

This session focuses on changes in Japan’s security policy. What are key issues in national debates on Japanese security planning and how might they be resolved? How has the political situation in Japan affected the national security debate? What are the Fukuda government’s national security policy priorities? Do they differ from those of its predecessors? How? How about the DPJ? How does Japan view its role and that of the Self-Defense Forces in regional and global security challenges and in the global war on terrorism? Have developments associated with Korean Peninsula denuclearization alleviated or increased Japanese concerns about extended deterrence? What is the status of the nuclear debate in Japan? What is the status of and prospects for constitutional reform? How has institutional change – the creation of the Ministry of Defense, for example – affected national security policy? What progress has been made on implementation of the May 2006 “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”? What obstacles exist?

- 10:30-10:45AM           Break
- 10:45AM-12:15PM      **Session II - Part B: United States Overview**  
*U.S. presenter:* Patrick Cronin, Institute for National Strategic Studies

This session examines U.S. security strategy as the 2008 elections approach. How can we characterize the U.S. national security strategy? Will Asian issues be a factor in the 2008 presidential election? If so, how? What changes and what continuities can be expected in U.S. foreign and security policy after the election?

What role will Asia play in U.S. thinking? What is the impact of Iraq and the situation in the Middle East? What is the U.S. seeking from its allies as it deals with challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran? What progress has been made in implementing the May 2006 Roadmap? How does the force posture realignment in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in South Korea and Guam, affect the U.S.-Japan alliance and basing issues?

12:15-12:30PM      **Session III: Future Vision of the Alliance**  
*U.S. Presenter:* Dr. Joseph Nye, Harvard University

12:30-2:15PM      Lunch      *Skyline Room A, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor*

2:30-4:30PM      **Session III: Future Visions of the Alliance (cont)**  
*Japan Presenter:* Kunihiko Miyake, AOI Foreign Policy Institute

How do the U.S. and Japan see their alliance evolving? What are key factors shaping cooperation and how can current levels of cooperation be sustained? How do values fit into the alliance? What do the U.S. and Japan expect of each other? What future challenges affect the alliance? What are the political/security-related areas in which future cooperation will be most important? How do the Six-Party Talks and regional security architectures fit into the alliance? Is more cooperation with South Korea desirable? If so, what can be done to facilitate such cooperation? How can the U.S. and Japan work together to encourage China to become a more responsible stakeholder? What will be the impact of the development of missile defense? Do we have a common vision regarding future security challenges and preferred responses? How can multilateral mechanisms and initiatives, including Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation, enhance future bilateral cooperation? Where does India fit in Washington's and Tokyo's strategic calculus? How can Japan and the U.S. cooperate in other areas, for example, economics?

3:30-3:45PM      Break

4:30-5:00PM      **Session IV: Conclusions and Wrap Up**

This session provides participants an opportunity to make overall observations or to focus further on specific issues. The chairs will make concluding remarks.

6:40 PM      Meet at lower lobby – street level

6:45 PM      Bus departs for Consul General's residence

7:00 PM      Reception/Dinner at Consul General Yasumasa Nagamine's residence



# APPENDIX C

## 14<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY SEMINAR

*Jointly sponsored by  
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA),  
the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco,  
and Pacific Forum CSIS*

**March 28-29, 2008**  
*J.W. Marriott Hotel • San Francisco*

### Young Leaders AGENDA

#### Thursday, March 27

6:00PM Meet at hotel lobby for an informal dinner  
(for those arriving early, local YLs are also invited if interested)

#### Friday, March 28

9:45AM Young Leaders meet at the lobby for quick introduction

10:15AM Leave for Federal Reserve

10:45AM Briefing and tour Federal Reserve Bank

2:20PM Walk back to the hotel

3:00-3:10 PM **Opening Remarks – Skyline Room B & C, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor**  
Welcome Remarks: Ralph Cossa, Pacific Forum CSIS

3:10-3:20PM **Opening Remarks – Yukio Satoh, JIIA**

3:20-3:30PM **Keynote Address: Ryozo Kato (delivered by Masafumi Ishii)**

3:30-5:30PM **Session I: Overview of the Global and Regional Security Environment**  
*U.S. Presenter: Mike Armacost*  
*Japan Presenter: Hisayoshi Ina*

The opening session explores developments in the regional and global security environment since our last meeting. It is intended to identify priorities for the United States and Japan, within Asia and worldwide, and highlight both shared and divergent concerns. Topics could

include issues related to China's growing status and influence in Asia (and the world); relations with Taiwan and the cross-Strait relationship, particularly after the presidential and parliamentary elections on the island; the North Korea denuclearization process; prospects for relations with Pyongyang; relations with South Korea after the ROK presidential elections; Middle East and Central Asian challenges; the role of multilateral institutions in Asia and the challenge posed by regional integration; and the role energy security plays in each country's foreign and national security policies. Is the regional balance of economic power shifting? How? What is its impact on the alliance? This overview will set the stage for subsequent discussions of U.S. and Japanese security policies and individual and bilateral efforts to address these challenges.

5:50PM                    **Adjourn**

6:00PM                    **Reception**                    *Skyline Room A, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor*

6:30-9:00PM            **Dinner**                    *Skyline Room A, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor*  
**Keynote Address:** Richard Armitage, President Armitage International

### **Friday, March 29**

7:30-9:00AM            Young Leaders Breakfast – **SALON I – 2<sup>nd</sup> Floor**  
**Speaker:** Evans Revere, President, Korea Society

9:00AM-12:15PM      **Session II: U.S. and Japan Security Strategies: Recent Changes, Future Plans, and Impact on Alliance Management**

9:00-10:30AM        **Session II A: Japan Overview**  
*Japan presenter:* Tsuneo Watanabe

This session focuses on changes in Japan's security policy. What are key issues in national debates on Japanese security planning and how might they be resolved? How has the political situation in Japan affected the national security debate? What are the Fukuda government's national security policy priorities? Do they differ from those of its predecessors? How? How about the DPJ? How does Japan view its role and that of the Self-Defense Forces in regional and global security challenges and in the global war on terrorism? Have developments associated with Korean Peninsula denuclearization alleviated or increased Japanese concerns about extended deterrence? What is the status of the nuclear debate in Japan? What is the status of and prospects for constitutional reform? How has institutional change – the creation of the Ministry of Defense, for example – affected national security policy? What progress has been made on implementation of the May 2006 "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"? What obstacles exist?

10:30-10:45AM        **Break**

10:45AM-12:15PM **Session II - Part B: United States Overview**

*U.S. presenter:* Patrick Cronin, Institute for National Strategic Studies

This session examines U.S. security strategy as the 2008 elections approach. How can we characterize the U.S. national security strategy? Will Asian issues be a factor in the 2008 presidential election? If so, how? What changes and what continuities can be expected in U.S. foreign and security policy after the election? What role will Asia play in U.S. thinking? What is the impact of Iraq and the situation in the Middle East? What is the U.S. seeking from its allies as it deals with challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran? What progress has been made in implementing the May 2006 Roadmap? How does the force posture realignment in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in South Korea and Guam, affect the U.S.-Japan alliance and basing issues?

12:15-12:30PM **Break**

12:30-2:15PM Lunch *Skyline Room A, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor*

**Session III: Future Vision of the Alliance**

*U.S. Presenter:* Dr. Joseph Nye, Harvard University

2:30-4:30PM **Session III: Future Visions of the Alliance**

*Japan Presenter:* Kunihiko Miyake

How do the U.S. and Japan see their alliance evolving? What are key factors shaping cooperation and how can current levels of cooperation be sustained? How do values fit into the alliance? What do the U.S. and Japan expect of each other? What future challenges affect the alliance? What are the political/security-related areas in which future cooperation will be most important? How do the Six-Party Talks and regional security architectures fit into the alliance? Is more cooperation with South Korea desirable? If so, what can be done to facilitate such cooperation? How can the U.S. and Japan work together to encourage China to become a more responsible stakeholder? What will be the impact of the development of missile defense? Do we have a common vision regarding future security challenges and preferred responses? How can multilateral mechanisms and initiatives, including Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation, enhance future bilateral cooperation? Where does India fit in Washington's and Tokyo's strategic calculus? How can Japan and the U.S. cooperate in other areas, for example, economics?

3:30-3:45PM Break

4:30-5:00PM **Session IV: Conclusions and Wrap Up**

This session provides participants an opportunity to make overall observations or to focus further on specific issues. The chairs will make concluding remarks.

5:00-6:30PM YL wrap up session

6:40 PM Meet at lower lobby – street level

6:45PM Bus departs for Consul General's residence

7:00PM Reception/Dinner at Consul General Yasumasa Nagamine's residence